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DREXELBROOK ASSOCIATES v. PENNSYLVANIA PUB.
UTIL. COMM'N: LIABILITY OF GARDEN APARTMENT
LANDLORD AS A PUBLIC UTILITY
Recently, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decided, in Drex-
elbrook Associates v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n,' that a
landlord of a large apartment complex who distributes utility serv-
ices to his tenants for a profit is not a public utility. Since the
service involved is not distributed "to or for the public" within the
meaning of the Pennsylvania Public Utility Law,2 the landlord's
service is not subject to commission regulation.3 The purpose of
this note is to evaluate the Drexelbrook decision, examine the
criteria for deciding what constitutes service to the public and sug-
gest guidelines for future determination of cases in this area.
Drexelbrook Associates owns and operates a garden type apart-
ment village known as Drexelbrook in Drexel Hill, Delaware Coun-
ty, Pennsylvania. This apartment village consists of some ninety
buildings, containing 1,223 residential units, nine retail stores, and a
club containing a swimming pool, tennis courts, a skating rink and a
restaurant. 4 An agreement was negotiated with Philadelphia Elec-
tric Company and Philadelphia Suburban Water Company whereby
these companies were to sell their distribution facilities within the
complex to Drexelbrook, who was then to distribute the gas, elec-
tricity and water to its tenants. Upon completion of the transfer,
water was to be supplied directly to Drexelbrook at four metering
points, with gas and electricity each delivered at one metering
point. Drexelbrook would then distribute the commodities to its
individual tenants, remetering and charging the retail rate based
upon individual consumption. Drexelbrook assumed that it would
qualify for the wholesale tariff rates for these commodities and by
retailing the service to its individual tenants would thereby make a
profit. The public utilities commission denied the utilities' appli-
cation for a certificate of public convenience in order to effect the
sale.5 The commission ruled that Drexelbrook, by receiving the
property and using it to distribute utility services, would become a
public utility. Without a certificate of public convenience to op-
erate as such, it was held to be an ineligible transferee. Drexel-
brook intervened and appealed to the superior court which divided
evenly, thereby affirming the commission's ruling.6 The case was
1. 418 Pa. 430, 212 A.2d 237 (1965).
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 1102(17) (a) & (b) (1959).
3. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 1121 (1959).
4. 418 Pa. at 432, 212 A.2d at 238.
5. 41 Pa. P.U.C. 505 (1964). The application was sought under section
202(e) of the Public Utility Law. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 1122(e) (1959).
6. 206 Pa. Super. 121, 212 A.2d 229 (1965).
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then certified to the supreme court which reversed, holding that
the ultimate consumers involved "consist only of a special class of
persons - those to be selected as tenants - and not a class open to
the indefinite public. Such persons clearly constitute a defined,
privileged and limited group and the proposed service to them
would be private in nature.
'7
The Public Utility Law clearly delineates the types of indus-
tries to be regulated with the general limitation that the service be
"to or for the public for compensation. '8  Even though a concern
is within one of the enumerated industries, it will be subject to regu-
lation only if it is serving the public. Various criteria have been
formulated to determine whether an industry is serving the public.
Generally, a concern which holds itself out as willing to serve all the
people indiscriminately to the extent of its capacity or within its
area of operation,9 the public generally, or any defined portion of
it, 10 or the indefinite public" is deemed to be a public utility.
Ordinarily the same result will be achieved irrespective of which
phrase is applied.
In Aronimink Trans. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n12 a landlord
supplied bus service to the tenants of his two apartment buildings
to and from an elevated railway terminal. The public utility bus
line claimed that the landlord was operating as a competing com-
mon carrier without having secured a certificate of public conven-
ience. The court decided that the service was private in nature and
not under the jurisdiction of the commission.
In Borough of Ambridge v. Public Serv. Comm'n,13 a manu-
facturer supplied another manufacturer with water from his own
surplus. The vendee-manufacturer had formerly been a substantial
customer of the local utility. The utility filed a complaint with the
public service commission against the vendor-manufacturer alleging
that it was a public utility operating without a certificate. The
7. 418 Pa. at 436, 212 A.2d at 240.
8. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 1102(17) (a) & (b) (1959). A public
utility is defined as:
... persons or corporations owning or operating ... facilities
for: (a) Producing, generating, transmitting, distributing ... nat-
ural or artificial gas, electricity, or steam . . . to or for the public
for compensation. (b) Diverting, developing, pumping, impound-
ing distributing or furnishing water to or for the public for com-
pensation.
9. Van Dyke v. Geary, 244 U.S. 39 (1917); Motor Freight Inc. v. Public
Util. Comm'n, 120 Ohio St. 1, 165 N.E. 355 (1929); Harder v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 90 Pa. Super. 373 (1927); Garkane Power Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 98 Utah 446, 100 Pac. 571 (1940).
10. Camp Rincon Resort Co. v. Eshelman, 172 Cal. 561, 158 Pac. 186
(1916); Masgai v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 124 Pa. Super. 370, 188 Atl. 599
(1936); In re Colorado Interstate Gas Co., P.U.R. 1933E, 349.
11. Thayer v. California Dev. Bd., 164 Cal. 117, 128 Pac. 21 (1912);
Overlook Dev. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 306 Pa. 43, 158 Atl. 869 (1932).
12. 111 Pa. Super. 414, 170 AtI. 375 (1934).
13. 108 Pa. Super. 298, 165 Atl. 47 (1933).
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superior court held that the service was private in nature.
The dissent in Drexelbrook attempted to distinguish these two
cases:
The context of both Ambridge and Aronimink is the prob-
lem of whether there is competition between utility suppli-
ers in dealing with the public which may be damaging to
the public interest. In that context it was decided that the
supply of service to a limited group of persons was not
service to the 'public."
14
The dissent argued that the context in which these cases were de-
cided makes their holdings inapplicable to the Drexelbrook situa-
tion. Such a distinction does not appear to be valid. The courts in
Ambridge and Aronimink applied the ordinary criteria and decided
that the concerns in question were not public utilities in any con-
text. This is not to say, however, that these cases are not distin-
guishable from Drexelbrook on other grounds.
It is well known that a public utility's field of operations is
limited by territory or capacity. In Drexelbrook, the corporate ac-
tivities were limited to the physical area of the Drexelbrook
apartment complex. Within that sizeable area it proposed to supply
all the residents indiscriminately. The field of operations encom-
passed by the landlord's bus service in Aronimink consisted of the
distance between the apartment and the terminal or approximately
one mile. The landlord's bus undertook to carry only those persons
possessing the identity card issued to the tenants of the apartments.
It never held itself out as willing to carry all members of the public
indiscriminately who applied for service at any of the three stops
which constituted its field of operations. 15 Thus under the defini-
tion of common carrier as enunciated by the court in Harder v.
Public Serv. Comm'n,16 that a common carrier is one who "under-
takes to carry for hire all persons indifferently who apply to him,' '1 7
the landlord could not be considered a common carrier subject to
the jurisdiction of the commission. In Ambridge it was even more
obvious that the manufacturer did not possess the indicia of a public
utility, since he never held himself out as willing to supply anyone
other than the specific vendee in question. This hardly qualifies
as an offer to serve the public indefinitely or indiscriminately.
In Overlook Dev. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n I a developer had
constructed a pipeline which connected with the pipes of the utility
water company. The developer entered into a contract with the
local utility, whereby the utility would supply water to him and
other individuals he allowed to connect onto his pipeline. The
water company agreed to the condition that the developer was to
14. 418 Pa. at 445, 212 A.2d at 244.
15. 111 Pa. Super. at 417, 170 Atl. at 376.
16. 90 Pa. Super. 373 (1927).
17. Id. at 375.
18. 306 Pa. 43, 158 Atl. 869 (1932) (per curiam).
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have exclusive control over the granting of connection permits.
The water company metered and charged each individual directly
on the basis of consumption. One individual refused to accept the
developer's terms and was denied connection rights. The public
service commission found that the pipe had been dedicated to pub-
lic use and ordered the connection. The superior court declared
the order confiscatory and unreasonable and reversed the commis-
sion's order.19 The supreme court held that the main was not de-
voted to public use since the developer did not hold himself out as
willing to serve the indefinite public. He had reserved the right
in the contract with the water company to decide who would con-
nect to the main and upon what terms. The distinction between
public and private use seems somewhat less clear in this case since
the developer was holding himself out as willing to serve anyone
with whom he can come to terms, though not necessarily indiscrimi-
nately. It does not appear, however, that there was any intention
that everyone in the area who desired to connect to the pipe would
be allowed to do so and hence no dedication to public use was in-
tended.
It should be noted here that in Overlook, as well as in Am-
bridge and Aronimink, the defendants did not possess a monopoly of
the service. In Ambridge the vendee-manufacturer was originally a
customer of the public utility. In Aronimink the utility provided
the same service, claiming that the landlord was competing. The
Overlook court infers that residents of the area might well have
demanded that the utility lay its own pipes and provide connec-
tions.20 The Drexelbrook tenants had no such option. They are a
captive public. Drexelbrook's contract with the utility created a
monopoly. The abuses that might reasonably follow by allowing
large areas of monopoly in utility service were not inherent in
Ambridge, Aronimink or Overlook. Moreover, there were no press-
ing policy considerations warranting a broadening of the rule. It
would appear, therefore, that the Drexelbrook court actually had
no clear mandate to follow.
To declare a concern a public utility which is inherently not a
public utility would violate the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Private property which is not devoted to public use
may not be made subject to public regulation by legislative fiat.
21
Whether a particular concern or a particular type of service is pub-
lic is a judicial question.2 2 Being a judicial question, the interpre-
tation of the term "public" by other courts should offer certain
19. 101 Pa. Super. 217 (1930).
20. 306 Pa. at 50-51, 158 Atl. at 872.
21. Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U.S. 522
(1923).
22. See, e.g., Black Rock Placer Mining Dist. v. Summit Water & Ir-
rigation Co., 56 Cal. App.2d 513, 133 P.2d 58 (1943); Natatorium Co. v. Erb,
34 Idaho 209, 200 Pac. 348 (1921).
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guidelines to be considered when interpreting the term as found in
the Pennsylvania statute.
23
An interesting Missouri case24 involved a landlord distributor
who supplied electricity to the tenants of his several buildings and
also solicited customers in the area of his transmission lines. It
was decided that he was a public utility to the extent that he was
servicing customers outside his own buildings. The service to his
own buildings, however, was private in nature and could not be
regulated by the public service commission. The court does not
reveal exactly how it concluded that the service to the landlord's
buildings was private in nature, but the conclusion does lend sup-
port to the decision in Drexelbrook.
In further support of Drexelbrook is a New Jersey case,
Junction Water Co. v. Riddle.25 The court concluded that an in-
dividual who supplied water from his own well through private
pipes to his tenants was not a public utility. The court declared the
true criterion to determine whether the concern is a public utility
"is whether or not the public may enjoy it of right or by permission
only. '26 This rule is occasionally applied by courts in other juris-
dictions.
2 7
The New Jersey rule has been justly criticized in Arizona 28 and
Wyoming. 29 In Rural Electric Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization30
the Wyoming court succinctly pointed out the infeasibility of such
a criterion:
To state that property has been devoted to public use is to
state also that the public generally, in so far as it is feasible,
has the right to enjoy service therefrom. It may be as
difficult to determine the one fact as the other. In such case
we cannot determine the right to demand such service by
the fact that the plant is a public utility, and the fact that
it is a public utility by the fact that the right to demand the
service exists. That would be simply reasoning in a circle.8 1
Such a criterion merely avoids the issue. Whether the concern is a
public utility and whether the public has a right to service are con-
clusions generally drawn from the same facts. The concern's ac-
23. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 1102(17) (1959).
24. State ex rel Cirese v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 178 S.W.2d 788 (Mo.
App. 1944).
25. 108 N.J. Eq. 523, 155 Atl. 887 (1931).
26. Id. at 525, 155 Atl. at 889.
27. See Clarksburg Light & Heat Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 84
W.Va. 638, 100 S.E. 551 (1919); see also Twelfth St. Market Co. v. P. & R.
Terminal R.R., 142 Pa. 580, 21 Atl. 989 (1891). Pennsylvania appears to
have since abandoned reliance on this criterion.
28. Natural Gas Serv. Co. v. Serv-Yu Co-op., Inc., 70 Ariz. 235, 219
P.2d 324 (1950).
29. Rural Electric Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 57 Wyo. 451, 120
P.2d 741 (1942).
30. 57 Wyo. 451, 120 P.2d 741 (1942).
31. Id. at 460, 120 P.2d at 747-48. (Emphasis added.)
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tivities determine whether it is a public utility. In so far as the
New Jersey criterion ignores the actual activities of the utility
which create the right of the public to demand service it is un-
workable. Moreover, cases based upon such reasoning would seem
to be of little moment in determining what factors make a concern
a public utility.
The Ohio Supreme Court concluded in Jonas v. Swetland Co.
32
that a realty company which distributed electricity to its tenants
and employees was not a public utility. In a later case,33 however,
a natural gas company who supplied natural gas to a few selected
domestic and industrial consumers was declared to be a public util-
ity. The court dismissed Jonas by the cursory statement that it
"presented no facts which gave a semblance of proof that the Swet-
land Company was engaged in the business of selling electricity
and therefore a public utility. '34 Although the most cursory read-
ing of Jonas would disclose that Swetland Company was indeed in
the business of selling electricity, the case has not been expressly
overruled and represents the law as to landlord distributors in Ohio.
In the Michigan case of Ten Broek v. Miller,3 5 a resort com-
pany's service of light and water to its cottagers was declared to be
service to the public. The court went on to declare Ten Broek a
semi-public utility without giving any standards for its pronounce-
ment or explaining what constitutes a semi-public utility.
A California case involving a similar situation which produced
a clearer decision was Camp Rincon Resort Co. v. Eshelman.36 The
maintenance of a telephone line by two resort companies was de-
clared to be a public service despite the resort companies' asser-
tions that the service was private in nature. The telephones were
for the sole use of sojourners in their camps and for use of which
they exacted a charge. The court reasoned:
The camps of the petitioners were open to the accommoda-
tion of the public. The telephone lines were devoted to the
use of the persons occupying these camps. . . . A service of
32. 119 Ohio St. 12, 162 N.E. 45 (1928). See also Southern Ohio Power
Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 110 Ohio St. 246, 143 N.E. 700 (1924).
State ex reL Bricker v. Industrial Gas Co., 58 Ohio App. 101, 16 N.E.2d
218 (1937).
34. Id. at 106, 16 N.E.2d at 221.
35. 240 Mich. 667, 216 N.W. 385 (1927).
36. 172 Cal. 561, 158 Pac. 186 (1916). But see Story v. Richardson,
186 Cal. 162, 198 Pac. 1057 (1921) wherein the landlord of a twelve story
office building serving his tenants with electricity from his own generating
equipment was held not to be a public utility. The court relied upon
Twelfth St. Market Co. v. P. & R. Terminal R.R., 142 Pa. 580, 21 Atl. 989
(1891), and Thayer v. California Dev. Bd., 164 Cal. 117, 128 Pac. 21 (1912),
and ignored Rincon. It should be noted, however, that Story arose on the
question of whether defendant Story was liable for a particular tax as-
sessed upon certain public corporations, and Rincon arose from the dis-
connecting of complainant's service. It is obvious that the action in Rincon
touches more closely the essence of utility regulation.
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this kind, offered to 'the public generally, or to any defined
portion of it,' is a public service .... The petitioners did
not offer the use of their telephone to privileged and se-
lected individuals in their camps. The service was offered
to all, within the class of camp occupants, who desired to
use it.
3 7
The Supreme Court of the United States has also pronounced its
judgment in this area of the law. In Van Dyke v. Geary3 8 the de-
fendant owned a water system by which she supplied water only to
those persons who purchased lots from her. These lots were plotted
on the defendant's land which was a part of a town inhabited by
several hundred consumers. The Corporation Commission of Ari-
zona sought to reduce defendant's rates. The defendant claimed
that the commission had no jurisdiction since the service was pri-
vate in nature and not offered to the public generally. The Court
said:
[T] he offer thus is to supply all the 'inhabitants' within the
given area. . . . The fact that the service is limited to a
part of the town of Miami does not prevent the water sys-
tem from being a public utility.3 9
Several hundred consumers were serviced by the defendant who
maintained the only source of supply for the development. The
court declared that "the character and extent of the use make it
public; and since the service is a public one the rates are subject
to regulation.
'40
When applying the words upon which Drexelorook based its
decision, "defined, privileged and limited group,"'" to Van Dyke and
Rincon, it appears that the principles involved are identical. The
consumers in both Van Dyke and Rincon were as privileged and lim-
ited as were the tenants in Drexelbrook. The difference is not one
of principle; it is one of technicality. In Drexelbrook the consumers
were tenants of the supplier; in Van Dyke and Rincon they were
not.
These cases seem to indicate that if the consumers are tenants
of the supplier then, ipso facto, they are outside the jurisdiction of
the commission. Such a distinction is certainly not imperative
from the generally accepted wording of the rule defining public
service as holding oneself out as willing to serve the public gener-
ally or any defined portion of it, 42 or as willing to serve all the
people within one's area of operations.
43
37. 172 Cal. at 562, 158 Pac. at 186.
38. 244 U.S. 39 (1917).
39. Id. at 48.
40. Ibid.
41. 418 Pa. at 436, 212 A.2d at 240.
42. Camp Rincon Resort Co. v. Eshelman, 172 Cal. 561, 158 Pac. 186
(1916); Masgai v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 124 Pa. Super. 370, 188 Atl. 599
(1936); In re Colorado Interstate Gas Co., P.U.R. 1933E, 349.
43. Van Dkye v. Geary, 244 U.S. 39 (1917); Motor Freight Inc. v.
P.U.C., 120 Ohio St. 1, 165 N.E. 355 (1929); Harder v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
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The rationale of the courts that have made this distinction can
probably be explained by either or both of two statements: (1) The
fact that the tenants resided in the supplier's private property lends
a special character of privateness over and above that conveyed by
the ordinary defined group; (2) The numbers of consumers affected
in those cases were negligible. Certainly the courts that decided
these cases did not conceive of the situation in which entire com-
munities would be tenants of a single landlord or a small group of
landlords.
This raises another general legal principle with respect to pub-
lic service. The Van Dyke decision was not based solely on the
fact that the Van Dykes offered to serve all the individuals in a
defined area. A large number of consumers were being served a
vital commodity by a monopolistic distributor. The majority refers
to this latter consideration as "the character and extent of the
use, ' 44 which means essentially that "one who uses his property in
supplying a large community with [a vital commodity] thereby
clothes such property with a public interest and subjects the busi-
ness to public regulation. ' 45 The large community mentioned in
Van Dyke was no larger than in Drexelbrook. No exact figures
are given of the total number served, but from the available facts4 6
it appears that the number was actually smaller than the total resi-
dence capacity of Drexelbrook. Based upon the public interest doc-
trine there appears to be no distinction between Van Dyke and
Drexelbrook. There does appear, however, to be a clear distinction
between Drexelbrook and those cases in which the numbers serv-
iced were negligible.
The reasoning of the Van Dyke court was applied by the Penn-
sylvania Superior Court in Pennsylvania Chautauqua v. Public
Serv. Comm'n.47 This line of reasoning could have been adopted
by the supreme court in Drexelbrook with better results than were
achieved. The Van Dyke approach is flexible and obviates the
necessity of distinctions based upon matters irrelevant to the basic
aims of public utility regulation. In Drexelbrook the entire public
interest aspect appears to have been practically ignored by both
sides in the controversy
Some measure of the future impact of Drexelbrook was
apprehended by the dissent when it drew the hypothetical situa-
90 Pa. Super. 373 (1927); Garkane Power Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 100
P.2d 571, 98 Utah 446 (1940).
44. 244 U.S. at 48.
45. Id. at 39.
46. Id. at 47.
47. 105 Pa. Super. 160, 160 Atl. 225 (1932). Appellant, a religious-
cultural corporation, purchased a tract of land upon which it founded a
community. The corporation installed a water system which serviced only
the area of the community, although some of the residents within the tract
were not members of the actual corporation. The corporation was held
to be a public utility.
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tion of a handful of giant landlords retailing service to perhaps as
many as 20,000 consumers. It observed that under the majority
rule these consumers would not be protected from inadequate serv-
ice and unreasonable rates, stating that:
Actually, if the majority is correct, then, in the preceding
example, the public consumer, whom the Legislature inten-
ded to protect, has disappeared into thin air. The landlord
is little more than a middleman, distributing the services for
a profit. He 'consumes' little if any of the service himself.
He has taken the place of a distribution subsidiary of the
public utility.
48
The dissent further states that in common sense the landlord
ought to be regulated "while distributing utility services to those
who really comprise the consuming public, '49 and concludes:
The problem which the majority does not face can only be-
come more aggravated with the continuation of the trend
of absorption of the consuming public into large scale leas-
ing projects of residential and commercial characters.50
CONCLUSION
Garden apartment projects similar in character to Drexelbrook
are becoming larger and more numerous. Many of them are prac-
tically self-sustaining communities containing stores, parks, clubs
and pools. It is illogical that the residents of these communities
should not have the guarantees of adequate service at a reasonable
rate which other members of the public enjoy, instead of being left
to the mercy of an unregulated monopolistic distributor. This is
precisely what the public utility law was enacted to prevent.5 1
It has long been recognized that the economic disparity caused
by monopoly induces the possessor of that monopoly to take advan-
tage of those who depend upon his produet or service. In the ab-
sence of regulation, monopolistic complacency and the desire for
profit will result in service of an inferior quality at higher prices.
5 2
The only recourse the tenant would have would be expensive and
uncertain litigation.53 Indeed, in many cases he would have no re-
course at all.
48. 418 Pa. at 444, 212 A.2d at 243.
49. Id. at 444, 212 A.2d at 243-44.
50. Id. at 445-46, 212 A.2d at 244.
51. See Relief Electric Light, Heat & Power Co.'s Petition, 63 Pa.
Super. 1 (1916).
52. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); The Case of
Monopolies, [1878] 6 K.B. 1260, 1263.
53. Unless covered by the lease the tenant generally would have no
remedy for exhorbitant rates. Where the service itself is so inadequate
as to deprive him of the beneficial use of the premises there might be a
constructive eviction which would suspend the tenant's liability for rent,
provided the tenant vacates within a reasonable time. See Tallman v.
Murphy, 120 N.Y. 345, 24 N.E. 716 (1890). One can hardly call a rule
which forces the tenant to vacate his residence a remedy.
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The lack of control over the landlord utility distributor gives
the landlord a competitive advantage and presents excellent profit
making opportunities, a situation likely to attract more landlords
into the field of utility distribution. In the future, distribution of
utility services by the landlord is likely to become the rule rather
than the exception, especially in the new multi-building complexes.
The landlords of these communities will install their own facilities
in the construction stage, demanding single point wholesale rates
while retailing the services to their individual tenant consumers.
Even the established concerns who do not submeter and retail serv-
ice are likely to follow the Drexelbrook example when the advan-
tages become apparent. The size of these concerns and their in-
creasing numbers make the unregulated distribution of service a
fact of most urgent public interest. The Drexelbrook rule is un-
realistic in the light of modern conditions.
It appears that when the criteria of public service are applied,
those courts that have dealt with the situation of the landlord sup-
plier have concluded that he is not a public utility. It is readily
evident that when the welfare of a large number of persons is at
stake, rules based upon such narrow and irrelevant issues as whose
tenants the consumers are, are plainly inadequate. The novel situa-
tion presented by Drexelbrook dictates a fresh look at the principles
of law which attempt to define service to the public in Pennsylvania.
Basing an analysis upon the import of Van Dyke and ignoring the
irrelevant consideration of whose tenants the consumers are, one
can arrive at a more realistic approach to the problem. In distin-
guishing between public and private utility service there are at
least two basic factors to consider: (1) Whether the service is af-
fected with a public interest; (2) Whether the concern has held it-
self out as willing to serve everyone indiscriminately within the
limits of its capacity or area of operations. This dual test would
allow the commission to eliminate from the scope of its regulation
the small landlord distributors whose service is not affected with a
public interest because of its limited extent.
The question of when a landlord's utility service ceases to be
private in nature must be answered in the light of the circumstances
of each case by reference to such factors as: The number and type
of buildings, the number of tenants, and the tenants' dependence
upon the landlord. The classification of the extremes, such as
Drexelbrook, will be relatively easy. The broderline cases will be
more difficult, but that is to be expected in any area of the law
where a broad legal principle is sought to be applied.
In Terminal Taxicab Co. v. Kutz, 54 the Supreme Court of the
United States gave recognition to the principle that mere volume or
extent of service may be a basis of distinction between public and
private service among concerns of the same class or type. The




Complaint is made that jurisdiction has not been assumed
over some other concerns that stand on the same footing as
the plaintiff .... The ground alleged by the commission
is that it did not consider that the omitted concerns did
business sufficiently large in volume to come within the
meaning of the act. There is nothing to impeach the good
faith of the commission or to give the plaintiff just cause
for complaint.55
The flexibility of this distinction allows the commission to
carry out the purposes of public utility regulation without the un-
due burden of regulating the many small concerns whose insignifi-
cant size indicates they are not a matter of public interest. This
concept is not revolutionary.56 Actually what is suggested here is
not a departure from existing principles of law, but rather the use
of common sense in applying them.
Under the suggested application of the principles of public
utility law, it is apparent that Drexelbrook and similar concerns
are public utilities and should be subject to appropriate regulation.
ALAN KRIER
55. Id. at 257. The act to which the court referred was the Act of
March 4, 1913, ch. 150 § 8, 37 Stat. 798:
[P]ublic utility embraces every common carrier including ...
every corporation . . . controlling or managing any agency for
public use for the conveyance of persons or property within the
District of Columbia for hire.
56. In Brinks Express Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 117 Pa. Super.
268, 178 Atl. 346 (1935), the court recognized that extent, as well as the
character of the service is a material consideration. The court held that
"before appellant's business can come under the supervision of the commis-
sion, it must ... affect a substantial part of the community." Id. at 276. 178
Atl. at 349.
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